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Abstract:   
Victims have become a topic of scholarly debate in conflict studies, especially regarding the 
impact of their activism on the evolution and termination of violence. Victims of terrorism are 
now enlisted within counterterrorism, given their moral authority as spokespeople for counter-
narratives and de-escalation. Our research explores how Spanish terrorism Victims’ 
Associations have evolved across eras of political violence and how they mediate the translation 
of international War on Terror discourses into Spanish counterterrorism. We offer a topography 
of how the War on Terror has opened a ‘social front’ in Spanish counter-terrorism, with Spanish 
political elites prominently employing the Victims’ Associations to this end. Contemporary 
terrorism discourses are read back onto the memory of ETA, with Victims’ Associations 
assisting the equation of ETA with Al Qaeda and ISIS. Collective memory of the defeat of ETA 
has also contributed the veneer of ‘lessons learned’ to contemporary counterterrorism measures. 
Our research explores the fluidity of terrorism-memory and the importation of global terrorism 
discourses into Spanish politics, relying upon interviews with key stakeholders in Victims’ 
Associations, local politics, and the research director of the new Centre for the Memory of 
Victims of Terrorism in Vitoria. 
Keywords: counterterrorism; victims; counter-narratives; depoliticisation; collective 
memory; Spain.  
Introduction 
In the last few decades, victims of terrorism are increasingly recognised by 
policymakers as possessing increased moral authority with regards to questions of 
security policy.1 Across Europe, victims’ organisations proliferate and many memorials, 
plaques, and monuments are dedicated to those who perished in specific attacks – often 
 
1 Lynch, Orla and Argomániz, Javier (eds), Victims of Terrorism: A Comparative and Interdisciplinary 
Study (London: Routledge, 2017); Muro, Diego, ‘Healing through Action? : The Political Mobilization of 
Victims of Al Qaeda-Inspired Violence in Spain and the United Kingdom’, Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 38:6 (2015), pp.478-493. 
2 
 
constructed on, or nearby, the site of their deaths.2 But there is one museum to terrorism 
in Europe which does not address a single event or rely on a physical connection to 
tragedy. The Memorial Centre for the Victims of Terrorism in Vitoria, Spain, tells a 
general story about terrorism and its victims – incorporating exhibits about jihadism, 
radical Basque nationalism and state-sponsored right-wing paramilitaries under one 
roof, flattening and erasing any differences between the groups, and between their 
victims. 
By presenting an equivalence between radically divergent militant groups and between 
their victims, the museum demonstrates the contemporary salience of victimhood in 
European security politics. It is only victimhood which connects the dead of the Atocha 
train station bombing in 2004 by jihadists, with the nearly 800 assassinations carried out 
by ETA between 1967 and 2011. ETA was a domestic, armed organisation which used 
violence to advance a broader separatist movement, whereas jihadism is often framed as 
‘international’ in origin and lacks any connection to Spanish social movements. 
Furthermore, ETA perpetrated the longest running insurgency in modern Europe – 
outlasting Irish republican and Italian leftist campaigns by many decades – whereas 
jihadist attacks in Spain are recent, and sporadic.  
No other European nation has created a non-specific museum to the victims of 
terrorism. We argue that the Memorial Centre for the Victims of Terrorism is the 
culmination of domestic and international shifts in the governance of terrorism, made 
particularly visible in the case of Spain by ETA’s longevity. 
The longevity of the ETA insurgency allows us to track the development of political, 
social and cultural discourses of terrorism victimhood through Spain’s approach to 
ETA. ETA’s armed struggle has been repeatedly re-scripted under the influence of new 
understandings of terrorism, both domestic and international. It is no coincidence that 
Europe’s only non-specific museum to terrorism is built in the Basque country. The 
longevity of ETA’s campaign has affected the way they are remembered. The historical 
overlap between ETA’s radical separatist campaign of car-bombs and assassinations, 
and Spain’s experience of jihadism, has meant that War on Terror frames are read back 
 
2 Heath-Kelly, Charlotte, ‘Survivor Trees and Memorial Groves: Vegetal Commemoration of Victims of 
Terrorism in Europe and the United States’, Political Geography 64 (May 2018), pp,63-72. 
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onto the legacy of ETA – allowing the differences between nationalist and jihadist 
organisations to be erased from collective memory, and ‘flattening’ the representation of 
terrorism as apolitical, fanatical violent crime. 
Importantly, this process was not accidental. In this article we trace how the emergence 
of peace activism in the 1980s gradually developed into a constellation of conservative 
Victims’ Associations – fostered by the Spanish state – and used to delegitimate Basque 
nationalism by labelling political movements as apologists for terrorism. Spanish 
security actors have profited from the transposition of contemporary understandings of 
terrorism as fanatical crime (rather than political struggle) to ETA, because it allows 
them to appropriate victims’ activism to delegitimate a wide range of Basque separatist 
activism as extremism. The zenith of this narrative transposition occurs in the Memorial 
Centre for the Victims of Terrorism where Europe’s longest running separatist militant 
struggle is equated with the international terrorism of Al Qaeda. 
In this article we provide a topography of developments in Spanish counterterrorism, 
the co-option of many victims’ associations by the state, and the collective memory of 
ETA. ETA’s longevity allows us to demonstrate wider cultural shifts in public 
understanding of political violence through the Spanish case study. Our research adds to 
an extremely interesting, yet nascent, literature on victims and their political 
representation by situating victims’ associations in both Spanish security politics and 
the international context of the War on Terror. While existing research has explored 
how the different constituencies of victimhood compete for narrative dominance and 
social authority,3 our paper will help to make sense of how victim's mobilization and 
narratives are shaped by the global context. 
The structure of our paper moves through a literature review of victims’ activism in 
politics, to a chronological exploration of how victims’ associations were incorporated 
into the Spanish counterterrorism regime, ending with an in-depth analysis of fraught 
memorialisation through the case of the Memorial Centre for the Victims of Terrorism. 
This case study is particularly important because it shows how the Spanish state 
 
3 Flesher Fominaya, Cristina and Rosemary Barberet, ‘The right to commemoration and “ideal victims”: 
the puzzle of victim dissatisfaction with State-led commemoration after 9/11 and 3/11’, Critical Studies 
on Terrorism, 11:2 (2018), pp.219-412 
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deposited this museum in the heart of the Basque country to bolster its own version of 
collective memory – specifically, that ETA, Al Qaeda and ISIS are comparable, 
totalitarian organisations. Here, memorialisation becomes a component within a 
counter-narrative campaign, which instrumentalises victims to prevent extremism 
through public delegitimation – transposing contemporary understandings of terrorism 
as apolitical fanaticism onto the past.   
Our research asks the following questions: What role do terrorism victims play in 
Spanish security politics? How are present day discursive frames read back onto the 
past and, concurrently, how are Spanish experiences of ETA used by political actors to 
claim counter-terrorism expertise and to justify new legal instruments? And finally, how 
does Memorial Centre for the Victims of Terrorism demonstrate these political and 
narrative processes, by curating ETA’s struggle alongside exhibits on Al Qaeda? 
 
 
Researching ETA and Spanish Security Politics  
The Basque Country straddles Northern Spain and France. Basque people are ethnically 
and culturally distinct from their neighbours and speak their own Euskara language. 
Approximately 91% of the 3 million Basque people live on the Spanish side of the 
Basque Country (Hegoaldea).  In 1959, a group of young Basque activists founded the 
ETA organisation – an acronym for ‘Euskadi ta Askatasuna’: ‘Basque Homeland and 
Liberty’4. The armed organisation was founded in the context of Franco’s dictatorship 
after the Spanish Civil War. General Franco staged his coup-d’état against the Spanish 
government in 1936, and Basque regions were divided in their response to the rebel 
government. Franco’s forces began to advance upon the Basque regions in 1937, and in 
April the Nazi regime’s support for Franco’s advance was confirmed by their 
intervention in the Spanish Civil War – which manifested in the destruction of Guernica 
by the Luftwaffe5. 25,000 Basques would perish in the Civil War, between 1936 and 
 
4 Ansderson, Wayne, The ETA: Spain’s Basque Terrorists (New York: Rosen, 2003), pp.5-6. 
5 Whitfield, Theresa, Endgame for ETA: Elusive Peace in the Basque Country (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), pp.38-9. 
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1939. While these losses were comparable with other regions of Spain, the Basque 
Country experienced the Civil War as a nationalist war – one where they were 
conquered by Franco.6 In the aftermath of the war, Franco banned the use of Euskara in 
public, destroyed the only university in the Basque country, and purged all those who 
had been loyal to the Basque nationalist cause.  
In its early years, ETA took inspiration from anti-colonial movements stretching from 
Algeria to Cyprus and developed particularly strong organisational ties with the Irish 
Republican Army and Latin American rebel organisations. In 1968, ETA claimed its 
first victim – shooting a Spanish military police officer in Guipúzcoa when he detained 
two members at a roadblock. Next, they assassinated police commissioner Melitón 
Manzanas – prompting a furious reaction from the Franco regime. A spiral of action-
repression-action then developed between the organisation and the regime, including the 
spectacular assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco in 
1973. 
However, ETA did not disappear upon the death of Franco in 1975, nor with the 
Spanish transition to democracy. Their armed mobilisation for Basque independence 
continued through Spain’s democratic transition, well into the twenty-first century, 
utilising car-bombs and firearms assassinations to pursue their political goals and their 
organisational survival. Many of their 800 victims were civilians, and deaths attributed 
to ETA peak in the late 1970s and early 80s – with 82 murders in 1980. After several 
failed peace processes in the first decade of the twenty-first century, ETA finally 
disbanded – without much fanfare – in 2011. 
To trace the representation of ETA (and their victims) in Spanish collective memory, we 
employ several methodological tools. Firstly, we have used documentary analysis to 
trace changes in Spanish terrorism laws. Secondly, we have used interviews and 
documentary analysis to trace the emergence of Victims’ Associations in Spain, and 
their gradual incorporation into Spanish security politics. Thirdly, we conducted a site-
visit to the Memorial Centre for the Victims of Terrorism to interview the Museum’s 
research director as well as to confirm that the site remains under construction.  
 
6 Ibid. 
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Our qualitative fieldwork (particularly the interviews) was carried out in different 
stages. Some interviews were conducted as part of a 2004 project funded by the 
European Union’s FP7 programme; others were conducted in 2009/10 within the PhD 
research of one of the authors. We also incorporate media sources from 2006 where 
prominent political figures discuss their preferred approaches to combatting terrorism. 
Finally, an interview was conducted at the Memorial Centre for the Victims of 
Terrorism in 2018. This sequencing of interviews helped us to recognise and track the 
shifts in Spanish collective memory of ETA, and the impact of the Victims’ 
Associations on mediating the import of War on Terror frames. In our original 
interviews from 2004, there is little evidence of the ‘international’ frames we find in the 
later transcripts. This transference of War on Terror ontologies occurred slowly, 
beginning to appear in 2006 and becoming far more prominent in our 2010 sample. By 
2018, the centrality of victimhood to the collective memory of ETA, and to the new 
social front in the War on Terror, is extremely evident.  
In the 2004  research, political and civil society elites involved in the politics of the 
Basque conflict (including national and regional politicians, trade unions, peace 
movements, constitutional movements, victims, and journalists) were presented with an 
extensive survey – designed to collect their recollections, information and attitudes. 
Most of the 43 participants were also interviewed by the researchers, to increase the 
depth of the data collection exercise. In 2009/10, a total of 27 in-depth interviews were 
carried out in with Spanish/Basque political elites and civil society organizations. We 
draw on part of this material for our genealogy and combine it with document analysis, 
interviews and online discourse of the Memorial Centre for the Victims of Terrorism in 
the autumn of 2018. 
These methods allow us to track how terrorism, and its victims, are framed differently 
across recent Spanish history. Importantly, we trace changes in Spanish 
counterterrorism to identify the importation of, and cross-pollination with, international 
frames. Crucially, our data collection finished in 2018 with the site visit to the 
Memorial Centre for the Victims of Terrorism. In a paper of this length, we are unable 
to extend our analysis to the important new twists and turns emerging in Spanish 
politics around, and after, the exhumation of Franco – particularly discussion 
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surrounding the criminalisation of ‘apologies for Francoism’. While crucial, we must 
conclude our discourse analysis in 2018. This still allows us to tell the story of the 
Victims’ Associations and the translation of War on Terror frames into Spanish 
counterterrorism, and how this has impacted the collective memory of the ETA 
struggle.  
The War on Terror paradigm we speak of is comprised of new ontologies of terrorism 
which emerged towards the end of the twentieth century, and the appropriation of ‘the 
social’ as a front in the fight against terrorism. Before the War on Terror (and its 
antecedent discourses found in 1990s terror discourse7), terrorism was prominently 
understood as armed conspiracy motivated by political and social goals. Armed groups 
were recognised as the militant wings of broader social movements, and it was not 
uncommon for analysts to track how violence ebbed and waned in accordance with 
losses and gains in the social movement’s campaign8. Political rhetoric still demonised 
militants as ‘monsters’, but they were pursued as egregious criminals in accordance 
with a law and order mandate.9 
The ‘War on Terror’ has produced a significant break with that ontology. In its early 
years, North American and Western European counterterrorism strategy and discourse 
was reorganised around the ‘New Terrorism’ frame of apocalyptic, non-strategic, non-
instrumental violence.10 Lisa Stampnitsky has charted the development of terrorism 
discourse across the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, paying particular attention to 
the roles of government agencies and think-tanks in producing the era’s understandings 
of fanatic fundamentalists, and how the terrorism industry slowly turned towards 
 
7 Tsui, Chin-Kuei, Clinton, New Terrorism and the Origins of the War on Terror (Abingdon, Routledge, 
2016).  
8 Crenshaw, Martha (ed), Terrorism in Context (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995); 
Della Porta, Donatella, Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of 
Italy and Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Miller, Reuben, ‘The Literature of 
Terrorism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 11(1), pp.63-87; Pape, Robert, Dying to Win: The Strategic 
Logic of Suicide Bombing (New York: Random House, 2006). 
9 Walker, Clive, The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1992). 
10 Crenshaw, Martha, ‘The Debate over ‘New’ vs. ‘Old’ Terrorism’, Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, 
Economics and Culture 10(1), 2003, pp.48-54;  Laqueur, Walter, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the 
Arms of Mass Destruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999);  
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notions of radicalisation and extremism.11 All pathologise the militant as deficient in 
rationality or social capital, deficiencies which drive them towards egregious violence.  
The split from the ‘law and order’ ontology of armed, strategic organisations has 
engendered an important practical shift in the counter-terrorism landscape: the police 
are no longer the sole counter-terrorism actors. Instead there is growing recognition that 
terrorism should be fought on the terrain of the social – incorporating a variety of 
different actors and professional fields, including social media companies, multi-agency 
partnerships, and victims themselves. All can be responsibilised with reporting and 
prevention of radicalisation or enlisted in counter-narrative campaigns to build 
resilience to extremist narratives.  
The increased salience and role of terrorism victims is our particular focus here. In the 
EU, the practice of enlisting/recruiting victims within Countering Violent Extremism 
projects (CVE) is becoming commonplace. The European Commission’s Radicalisation 
Awareness Network dedicates an entire working group to the integration of victims in 
counterterrorism (RAN RVT – Remembrance of Victims of Terrorism). Their 
testimonies and experiences are framed as resources for the fight against radicalisation 
in Europe, through increasing empathy for those who have suffered. Yet in Spain, 
victims have been at the forefront of counterterrorism since the early 2000s - before 
CVE policy programmes started to globalize12. Victims hold a special place in the 
history of Spanish counterterrorism, and their activism (and memorialisation) allow us 
to tell the story of how international security discourses have cross-pollinated with the 
domestic. 
Academic research on the activism of terrorism victims is still limited in size, but is 
situated within a broader turn towards victims and victimhood across the social 
sciences13. Recent research has approached the role of victims in the evolution and 
termination of political violence. Although comparative approaches are still scarce, 
 
11 Stampnitsky, Lisa, Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented ‘Terrorism’ (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013). 
12 Kundnani, Arun and Hayes, Ben, The Globalisation of Countering Violent Extremism Policies (New 
York: TNI, 2018).  
13 Wieviorka, Anette, The Era of Witness (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
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some interesting cross-country comparisons have been produced14. There is also 
comparative research explaining socio-cultural similarities and differences in victim´s 
collective actions demanding recognition15. Due to Spain’s long-term experience 
fighting ETA in the context of the Basque nationalist conflict, and the prominence of 
terrorism`s victims in Spanish politics, their role as political actors has been a matter of 
a detailed analysis16. 
Alonso17 highlights the relevance of Spanish victims as an interest group, exerting 
pressure on social and political debates. In a more political analysis, Fernández de 
Mosteyrín explores the process of violence delegitimation in Spain across the 2000s 
through the mobilisation of victims and civic movements in coalition with major 
political parties18. In this process, civil society organizations created and mobilised new 
narratives on terrorism and counterterrorism. More recently, Argomaniz has focused on 
the ideological dimension of victims’ mobilization by explaining their role as conveyers 
of a counterterrorist narrative19. Continuing this line of research, Tallidis has explored 
the different narratives of political actors, successfully pointing at the discourse of 
negation of conflict as an obstacle to peace20. It is to this promising line of inquiry that 
our contribution adds. 
As we detail in the next section, victims have been incorporated as central protagonists 
within states’ counter-narrative agendas against subversive movements. 
 
 
14 Lynch & Argomániz (eds), Victims of Terrorism. 
15 Muro, ‘Healing through Action’. 
16  Gabriel Gatti, David Casado-Neira, Ignacio Irazuzta, Maria Martinez, Sandrine Revet, Jaume Peris 
Blanes & Josebe Martinez, Un mundo de víctimas (Barcelona: Anthropos, 2017); Serrano, Ágata , ‘La 
lucha social contra el terrorismo: testimonios de algunas víctimas de ETA’, Eguzkilore cuaderno del 
Instituto Vasco de Criminología 26 (2012), pp.253-279. 
17 Rogelio Alonso, ‘Victims of ETA’s terrorism as an interest group: Evolution, influence, and impact on 
the political agenda of Spain’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 29:6 (2017), pp.985-1005 
18 Fernández de Mosteyrín, Laura. La guerra contra el terror y la transformación de los umbrales de 
violencia tolerada: un estudio de la violencia en el País Vasco (1998- 2010). Doctoral Dissertation. 
Universidad Complutense de Madrid. ISBN: 978-84-617-5203-4. (2013).  
19 Argómaniz, Javier, ‘A battle of narratives - Spanish victim’s organisations international action to 
delegitimise terrorism and political violence’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 41:7 (2017), pp.573-588.   
20 Ioannis Tellidis, ‘Peacebuilding Beyond Terrorism? Revisiting the Narratives of the Basque 
Conflict’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2018) https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1452794  
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Victimhood and Counterterrorism: From Peace Activism to Counter-Narrative 
Campaigns 
The shift in victims’ activism, and the uses to which it is put, is a striking feature of 
Spanish security policy across the decades. Popular mobilisation against conflict began 
in the mid-1980s, beginning with small scale pacifist demonstrations in the Basque 
Country and the formation of peace organisations (Association for Peace and 
Reconciliation in Euskal Herria, and Gesture for Peace in Euskal Herria).21 The 
protests organised by Gesture for Peace often took the form of silent vigils against 
ETA’s violent domination of Basque society.  
 
These demonstrations reached their peak in 1997, and with millions of people joining 
the protests victims’ activism became burgeoning social movement. 1997 was just one 
year after the premiership of José Maria Aznar (of the People’s Party, PP) began. Aznar 
was the first openly conservative Prime Minister since the rule of Franco. His political 
campaign had leant heavily on promises to defeat ETA and eradicate its networks, and 
he was seen as a natural champion of the victims.22   
 
In the mid-1990s, ETA increased its targeting of civil society representatives. The Civil 
Guard managed to free ETA’s high-profile hostage, prison officer José Ortega Lara, in 
1997 – only for ETA to immediately retaliate by kidnapping the conservative politician, 
M. A. Blanco (of Aznar’s People’s Party) in Ermua (Euskadi). ETA demanded that its 
 
21 Serranò, Agata, The Evolution and Protection of the Rights of Victims of Terrorism in Spain, paper 
presented to the European Consortium of Political Research, Bordeaux 2013. Available from 
https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/0d9a078b-e975-4a20-8d98-61c6e10c4c88.pdf (last accessed 
3rd March 2020). 
22 Tarín Sanz, Adrián & Rivas Otero, José Manuel, ‘Leadership Styles and War and Peace Policies in the 
Spanish-Basque Conflict: A Discourse Analysis of José María Aznar and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’, 
Social Sciences 7(68).  
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prisoners be re-grouped in Basque jails, in exchange for Blanco’s release. Aznar’s 
government refused, and ETA assassinated their hostage.  This became a turning point 
in the Basque and Spanish civil societies as a whole23. A large coalition emerged against 
terrorism. Massive demonstrations took place across the country mobilising many 
different new organizations that would eventually cohere as a constitutional movement. 
Importantly, these demonstrations began as organic, spontaneous demands for peace. 
The ideological atmosphere of the ‘constitutional movement’ made up by civil society 
organizations around victims of terrorism was called The Spirit of Ermua.  
 
In the next decade (1997-2008), multiple new Victims Associations were set-up, 
including: Asociación de Víctimas del Terrorismo (AVT); and Colectivo de Víctimas del 
Terrorismo (COVITE). These groups allied with civic organizations (Movimiento 
Manos Blancas, Iniciativa Ciudadana Basta Ya, Fundación Foro de Ermua), to 
campaign for victims’ recognition and increased security. Except for the anti (Iraqi) war 
movement in 2003, the largest public demonstrations for two decades were against ETA 
or demanding tougher response to terrorism by the state. According to the Spanish 
Interior Ministry, 4,000 demonstrations took place against terrorism between 1998 and 
2006.  
 
Although collective action against violence was not new, the second wave of anti-
terrorism demonstrations (from the mid 2000s) showed a rather different face compared 
to the previous. These were not peace movements of the like examined by Funes24 and 
 
23 Funes, María Jesús, ‘Social responses to political violence in the Basque Country: Peace movements 
and their audiences’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 42:4 (1998), pp.493-510.  
24 Funes, Social Responses to Political Violence. 
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Tallidis25.  Their frame, their demands and their repertoires of collective action26 were 
not pacifist, but an effort to connect terrorism to nationalism and marginalise ETA's 
social support by defending the established constitutional system against nationalist 
demands. Victims’ activism was politicised through claims about the necessity of 
tougher measures against ETA and its political support structure.  A new narrative about 
the problem of terrorism was disseminated through a wide repertoire of actions 
including mass demonstrations, judicial processes and public engagement activities like 
lectures, seminars, workshops, periodical publications27. The ‘politics of delegitimation’ 
was the process by which this movement, in coalition with political parties and 
governments, mobilized narratives on terrorism that shaped Spanish regulations. This 
discourse identified radical nationalism as the wellspring of terrorism and its social 
support and attempted to marginalise it – mirroring the counter-narrative approaches to 
terrorism, now commonplace in Europe. 
 
In clear opposition to Basque peace movements during the eighties and nineties, a new 
diagnosis of the problem of ETA had emerged.  The emerging political narrative on the 
problem of terrorism had the following schema/plot: (1) there was no political conflict 
between the Basque country and Spain, and pacifist movements were wrong to pursue 
dialogue as a strategy towards peace; (2) terrorism is irrational-criminal and non-
political violence; (3), the 'full force of law' is the solution, which entails an expansion 
 
25 Tallidis, Peacebuilding Beyond Terrorism. 
26 McAdam, Doug; Tarrow, Sidney & Tilly, Charles, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001).  
27 Fernández de Mosteyrín, Laura.  La guerra contra el terror y la transformación de los umbrales de 
violencia tolerada.  
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of coercive regulations without invoking special powers, but including proscription of 
political parties; and (4), victims are central to the delegitimation of terrorism. 28  
 
Plot points 2 and 4 are particularly indicative of the transposed War on Terror ontology 
and its accompanying counter-terrorist strategy – a point we will return to later. First, 
we shall demonstrate the presence of these features in Spanish laws. Each of the four 
points were inscribed in the Agreement for Liberties and against Terrorism (an Anti-
terrorist Agreement between the two major political parties in 2000, the PSOE and PP). 
This policy framework toughened criminal codes, increased police sophistication and 
intelligence methods, and expanded international cooperation – using an image of 
Basque terrorism as a rallying point. As a result, 'Apology for terrorism' was codified as 
a crime and new regulations expanded throughout the decade. This law criminalised 
forms of commemoration and speech understood to demonstrate sympathy for ETA 
prisoners. Victims’ associations now monitor commemorative gatherings in homage to 
ETA members in the Basque country as forms of extremism, denouncing these 
demonstrations to the police and in an attempt to secure prosecution29.  
 
Even more controversial was the Political Parties Act (2002) which proscribed radical 
nationalist parties, extending the reach of moves to criminalise the ‘refusal to condemn 
 
28 Fernández de Mosteyrín, Laura. (forthcoming) Communication as legitimation in Spanish CVE: 
bringing lessons from the past. In Martini, A, Ford, K., and Jackson, R (eds.). Encountering Extremism: A 
Critical Examination of Theoretical Issues and Local Challenges. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press.  
29According to COVITE’s Observatory of Radicalization there were 399  acts of terrorist legitimation 
between 2016 and 2020 in the form of homages, paintings or demonstrations in favour of prisoners 
amnesty: https://covite.org/observatorio/ 
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terrorism’30. This initiated the decline of ETA’s community of support31. This 
constitutional movement and the programme of legal measures found wide societal 
support among public opinion with alternative and more nuanced visions among Basque 
Community32. 
 
The international context of depoliticizing ETA - Using the War on Terror Paradigm 
The late 1990s and early 2000s saw the international spread of policy discourses which 
categorised terrorism as irrational and non-political in nature33. As examined earlier, the 
discourse of ‘New Terrorism’34 narrated an epochal shift in the causes of terrorism as 
political violence increasingly appropriated religious ideology. This narrative of 
‘apocalyptic’ terrorism influenced policymakers in the Global North to abandon 
negotiation and prosecution as conflict resolution methods, and paved the way for 
policies familiar to the early years of the War on Terror – such as counter-radicalisation 
policies, and counter-narrative campaigns which deploy victims and their stories to 
build social empathy with the victims of terrorism and delegitimate armed struggle.35 
We have referred to this as the opening of a ‘social front’ in counter-terrorism. 
 
 
 
30 Pierre-Guittet, Emmanuel, ‘Is Consensus a Genuine Democratic Value? The Case of Spain’s Political 
Pacts Against Terrorism’, Alternatives 33 (2008), pp.267-91. 
31 Whitefield, Teresa, Endgame for ETA. Elusive Peace in the Basque Country (London: Hurst 2014).   
32 Euskobarómetro,  Informe del Centro Memorial de las Víctimas del Terrorismo. La Sociedad Vasca 
ande la Memoria del las Víctimas y el Final del Terrorismo (#2, Julio 2017): 
https://www.ehu.eus/documents/1457190/1547454/informe+centro+memorial+y+euskobarometro.pdf/8c
93924f-20f7-44c4-a4fb-25153f816202 (last accessed 28 October 2019). 
33 Jackson, Richard, Writing the War on Terror: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 2005).   
34 Duyvesteyn, Isabelle, ‘How New is the New Terrorism?’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27:5 
(2004), pp.439-54; Laqueur, Walter, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
35 Argomaniz, Javier & Lynch, Orla, ‘Introduction to the Special Issue: The Complexity of Terrorism – 
Victims, Perpetrators and Radicalization’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 41(7), pp.491-506. 
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Our fieldwork with Spanish and Basque elites has shown that strong efforts were made 
in this period to open a social front in the war against terrorism, but in 2004 this 
narrative was limited to rejecting the causal significance of external, political and 
structural factors for separatist violence. All the non-nationalist actors we spoke to 
agreed that the radical Basque nationalists had been very successful in presenting their 
cause to international audiences in the 80s and 90s, and they responded by denying and 
undermining the political roots of the struggle. The President of the Foro de Ermua (a 
Basque civil society organisation working to represent the victims of ETA) stated to 
researchers in 2004 that: 
‘…Confusion. It is an attempt of conflict (…) the first instrument of Basque nationalism 
was the creation of an invented situation (...) a situation that provoked a perception of 
victimisation that is not real’36. 
 
The President strongly refused any connections between Basque social movements, 
political history and ETA’s armed struggle – denouncing such narratives as ‘attempts at 
confusion’. This relegation of armed actors as fanatics continued, but after the effects of 
the March 11th 2004 bombings, politicians began to explicitly draw on War on Terror 
in their condemnations of ETA and their drive for political consensus around 
condemnation (Pierre-Guittet 2008); for example Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero has 
made clear use of the ‘apolitical fanatic’ ontology of terrorism in his speeches: 
 
‘Anyway, in the terrorism issue consensus are much more meaningful and 
numerous than differences. The unity of all democrats against terrorism has been 
the core challenge of Spanish political parties. It has also been a fruitful element 
 
36 Interview with President of the Foro de Ermua. Madrid, November 2004. Author’s fieldwork interview. 
Carried out in the in the context of the project (removed for review). 
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insofar as it allow us to set a lined that differentiated not the left and the right, the 
nationalist and statalist, but the democrats and the violents’. 37 
 
However, using the War on Terror narrative of ‘new terrorism’ (apocalyptic, apolitical 
and ungrounded in social struggles) to frame ETA was not without its challenges and 
discursive ruptures in this early period. The Atocha station bombing of March 11th 2004 
led to a profound rupture in efforts to homogenise the eras of terrorism within one 
Spanish narrative. 
 
Research has shown that the Prime Minister’s misattribution of the 11th March 
bombings to ETA provoked the politicization of left-allied victim's associations. Their 
outrage at the careless blaming of ETA for their loved one’s deaths led them to publicly 
advocate a very different narrative about the causes of terrorism (i.e Spanish 
belligerence in the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan). This temporarily displaced 
the monolithic conservative narrative of victims of ETA. A divide opened between 
associations representing victims of ETA, and those representing the dead of Atocha38. 
The contention among victims’ organizations intensified when the socialist government 
attempted dialogue with ETA in 2006 - generating a strong new wave of demonstrations 
in which the transposition of War on Terror ontology onto ETA was specially visible 
under the slogan 'not [negotiation]in my name'. Negotiation would mean giving political 
meaning to terrorism and, as it was established since the Antiterrorist Agreement, there 
was no politics in terrorism.  
 
37 José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, former president of Spanish government, quoted in Garzòn, 
Baltasar, La Lucha contra el Terrorismo y sus Límites (Madrid: Adahara Editorial, 2006), p.24 
 
38 Flesher Fominaya, Cristina, ‘The Madrid bombings and popular protest: misinformation, counter-
information, mobilisation and elections after ‘11-M’, Contemporary Social Science 6:3 (2011), pp.289-
307. 
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While a powerful rupture, this contestation of the dominant conservative narrative was 
temporary. At the end of the decade, when ETA was coming to an end, the depoliticized 
War on Terror ontology applied to ETA was normalised. Indeed, international politics 
was considered by Victims Association activists and politicians as paramount to aiding 
the domestic delegitimation of ETA:  
‘If, in the international sphere, [terrorism] stops being understood as a 
revolutionary instrument for justice, then it helps us...this is why we have to care 
for what them to have a good knowledge of what is going on here...' 39 
 
“Democracies from all over the world, especially the European ones, have their 
responsibility [in the endurance of violence]. The ignorance on the real situation in 
the Basque Country and Spain, the distance with which they were observing what 
was going on, the skepticism, the indifference (....) favoured for many years, in 
many media forums, that intellectuals, scholars and politicians around the world 
would see ETA´s activity either with sympathy or with certain understanding. 
Together with the international activism of pro-etarras [ETA supporters] (...) 
generated an international equidistant attitude. (...) This indifference, with which 
Europeans have observed the Basque terrorism, vanished on 9/11. The feeling of 
vulnerability, the insecurity pushed (and how strongly it did!) some European 
reluctant to implement two European initiatives (...)”40  
 
ETA finally renounced armed struggle in 2011 in the context of indifference from the 
Spanish government and its main political parties. It was the termination of almost fifty 
years of violence whose end came about with no apparent political impact. How was the 
termination of ETA’s struggle such a non-event? The answer lies in co-option of 
Victims’ Associations and the opening of a social front in the Spanish War on Terror 
during the period 2004-2011. By flattening the historical and contextual differences 
 
39 Activist of Foro de Ermua, interviewed by author. Madrid, December 2009. 
40 Rosa Díez, UPYD elected politician, quoted in Garzón, La Lucha contra el Terrorismo, pp.103-
104.  
 
18 
 
between militant organisations of historical and contemporary nature, ETA became ‘just 
one of many’ terrorist organisations operating in the domestic and international sphere. 
 
The constitutional and victims’ movements emerged from the very local dynamics of 
the Basque conflict and yet, across the decade, the importation of war on terror 
discourses altered both. The absorption of terrorism’s victims and Spanish security into 
the War on Terror frame radically disconnected both from their original relationship 
with ETA. ETA became ‘just another’ instance of a global insecurity phenomenon 
(terrorism), against which state and society continued to struggle.  
 
As illustrated before, the assassination of M. A. Blanco in 1997 sparked the 'enough is 
enough' spirit known as the Spirit of Ermua, and allowed new civil society actors with 
wide societal support to reformulate understandings of political violence. Above all, the 
Antiterrorist Agreement gave a voice and support for victims, opening the space for 
multiple initiatives that recognised the status and suffering of victims of terrorism. As a 
consequence, in 2001 the Fundación Víctimas del Terrorismo (FVT) was a state-led 
initiative to coordinate and channel support for the many victims’ associations across 
the country and to better fulfil historical demands of recognition, dignity and justice.  
 
The existing Law of Solidarity with Victims of terrorism (CD32/1999) was reformed in 
2003 for purpose of civic recognition, as well as to include victims of terrorist attacks 
abroad. However, the Agreement did more than merely recognise and dignify victims. It 
opened the space for their political instrumentalization, as Alonso argues41. It is not our 
point to argue for or against the autonomy of victims, but to suggest that it was in the 
context of this agreement that their voices opened, and sustained, the ‘social front’ in 
Spain’s War on Terror. Victims’ became central, and coopeted actors, within the 
Spanish state’s transposition of War on Terror ontologies of terrorism (fanatical, 
apolitical extremism) and efforts to delegitimate and silence radical actors. 
 
41 Alonso, Victims of ETA’s terrorism as an interest group. 
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This co-option of victims’ activism by the state is particularly evident with regards to 
collective memory of terrorism. In 2011 a new Law For Victims of Terrorism (Ley 
29/2011 de 22 September de Protección Integral de Víctimas del Terrorismo) included, 
among many other things, the recognition of victims of terrorism as comparable in 
states to military personnel killed in peacekeeping operations. This law also presented 
initial plans for the Memorial Centre for the Victims of Terrorism - not intended just for 
the remembrance of the past, but as a mechanism for counter-narrative campaigns in the 
Basque region. The 'battle of narratives' eloquently illustrated by Argomániz42 had 
become ever more prominent after the end of ETA. In formalising a particular account 
of Spanish history, the politicians used the museum - and Victims’ Associations - to 
deny, and even criminalise, the political claims of Basque nationalists, through their 
counter-narrative campaign. As we showed earlier, counter-narrative campaigns are 
central to contemporary European counter-terrorism – relying upon, and perpetuating, 
ontology and strategies that are central to the War on Terror era.  
 
But contemporary counter-terrorism ontologies are not just read back onto the past; 
Spain’s experience of fighting ETA is also used to legitimate the introduction of new 
policies. This blurring of the era’s, as we show here, further points to the equivalence 
drawn between the ETA campaign and contemporary jihadism. In 2012, while 
addressing the Spanish victim’s organizations, a Spanish General promoted the potential 
of counter-narrative work and societal resistance as a strategy against jihadism – given 
that it had worked against ETA:  
  “What can be done? What you people do …Resist. We should resist. We should 
strengthen our society … even if there are attacks (...) we need to fight (….) the first and 
foremost strategy is negation. It is to convey the message that you will never gain 
political ends. It is impossible!. (…) This is why we need to stimulate resilience as the 
capacity of all society around its victims.”43 
 
 
42 Argomaniz, A battle of narratives. 
43 Asociación Víctimas Terrorismo, Desafíos del terrorismo actual (conferencia dirigida a la AVT por el 
General M.A Ballesteros, director del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, 2012). Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3_GwQ1RVqqQ (last accessed: September 1st 2019) 
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The past was identified as a very useful resource, with which to refresh Spanish CT 
discourse by constantly relying to the lessons learned. For example, as a former director 
of the National Policing Agency has stated:  
“Spain has extensive experience in CT. Throughout many decades, we have combated 
the terrorist gang ETA that caused intense suffering to Spanish society, yet was 
defeated. So, Spain is among the countries in the international community that shows 
that it is possible to defeat terrorism with determination, courage and the rule of law”44.    
 
The framing of ETA as ‘a gang’ also carried over into security service discussions of 
how to refer to ISIS: 
“DAESH and not Islamic State (...) among my colleagues and security agencies 
personnel we refuse to speak of Islamic State because to some extent it is legitimizing. 
It is DAESH, an international terrorist organization. And this is something we should 
start making publicly aware and remark on, we need to say each thing in its own 
terms”45. 
 
 
Similarly, stakeholders drew from their ‘learning’ about incorporating ETA’s victims 
into a social front of counterterrorism. Victims have become useful as exemplars of 
collective resilience; they represent ‘determination and courage’, so making them 
bearers of the counter-narrative campaign makes stronger societies. According to the 
Spanish National Security Strategy46 victims are the social group with moral superiority 
in representing society’s efforts and this is where the transposition of a narrative against 
ETA is most prominent.  
“Terrorist’s victims should be at the forefront of counterterrorism, not only for 
adequate recognition, but as an instrument for countering radicalization and 
violent extremism. The dissemination of counterterrorist culture, through 
pedagogic exercises over past events and hate dissolution are paramount”47.  
 
44 Instituto de Seguridad y Cultura , Interview with former director of the Spanish National Police 
Agency, CNP (June 12th 2017). Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ou0l1eDvGto 
45Spanish Counterterrorist and Organized Crime Intelligence Agency (CITCO) personnel. Broadcasted 
Seminar(Real Instituto Elcano, 2017, min 40) 
46 Departamento de Seguridad Nacional, Gobierno de España, Informe Anual de Seguridad Nacional 
(2017) https://www.dsn.gob.es/es/actualidad/sala-prensa/aprobacion-del-informe-anual-seguridad-
nacional (last accessed September 1st 2019). 
47 Ibid, p.26.   
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In sum, and according to 2011 victim's law,  
“Political signification of victims requires their social recognition and becomes 
an essential tool to the ethical, social and political delegitimation of terrorism. 
Remembrance is an act of justice and a civilising instrument, at the same time 
(…) a tool for the complete social delegitimation of the use of violence to 
assert political ideas”.48  
 
This incorporation of remembrance and Victims’ testimonies into the War on Terror’s 
‘social front’ reached its culmination in 2015. In that year, Spain’s first policies on 
Countering Violent Extremism were enacted. In response to the departure of thousands 
of Europeans for Syria as foreign fighters, Spanish authorities brought forward a new 
Counter-jihadist Agreement in 2015 which expanded counter-terrorism capacities. With 
very little public debate around it, this programme reproduces global p/CVE policy 
paradigms49. Although CVE programmes are new in Spain, ‘extremism’ has been 
successfully prosecuted since the early 2000s, when counter-terrorist legislation was 
expanded to cover acts of ‘glorification’ in the Basque case. The criminalisation of 
‘glorification’, in particular, enabled Spanish officials to insert anti-jihadist measures 
into an established narrative about defeating ETA’s support base.  The importance of 
the domestic/international intersection of terrorism discourses in Spain is that these new 
powers were legitimated through appeals to prior experience with ETA. There is a 
fluidity to the cross-pollination of domestic and international discourses of terrorism, 
with evidence that transfer occurs in both directions.  
 
The denial of political roots to the Basque conflict, and the mobilisation of victimhood 
and memory within Spanish counterterrorism, is demonstrated to the highest degree at 
the Memorial Centre for the Victims of Terrorism, planned for Vitoria in the Basque 
Country – to which we now turn our attention. 
 
48 Boletín Oficial del Estado, Gobierno de España,  Ley 29/2011 de 22 de Septiembre, de Reconocimiento 
y Protección Integral a las Víctimas del Terrorismo (BOE  núm. 229, de 23 de septiembre de 2011), 
p.0100566 BOE – emphasis added by author.  https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/2011/09/22/29 
49 Fernández de Mosteyrín, Laura & Limón, Pedro, ‘Paradigmas y Políticas de Seguridad: una 
aproximación al Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta PEN-LCRV 
2015’, Política y Sociedad 54:3 (2017), pp.805-827.  
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Memory and denial of conflict in the Spanish Centre for the Memorialization of 
the Victims of Terrorism 
 
The dynamics explored above, in relation to the role Victims’ Associations have played 
in Spanish memory politics, have most recently crystallised around a disused building in 
Vitoria-Gasteiz. It is here that the Memorial Centre for the Victims of Terrorism is 
planned. Museological curation will be used to solidify, and bring into material 
existence, the denial of political roots to separatist violence. The Memorial Centre 
represents, we argue, the pinnacle of longstanding efforts to operationalise victimhood 
in the service of counter-terrorism – while reading War on Terror ontology back onto 
past militancy. As we will demonstrate here, the contemporary discourse of ‘counter-
narratives’ from the arsenal of Countering Violent Extremism measures is marshalled to 
explain the purpose of the Memorial Centre. 
 
One of the provisions of the 2011 Act on the Victims of Terrorism was the creation of a 
national centre for the Memory of the Victims of Terrorism in the Basque Country. The 
Centre has been delayed in opening, but has obtained premises in Vitoria-Gasteiz (the 
Basque administrative capital), has a full website50, and maintains a staff of researchers 
who plan the exhibits and the ‘documentation centre’ (an archive of materials, 
potentially of use to researchers of Basque political violence). In our conversations with 
the Memorial Centre’s research director, it became very clear that a wide range of 
violent struggles would be juxtaposed in the museum – from Al Qaeda, to ETA, to 
right-wing paramilitaries employed by the Spanish state to repress the Basque radical 
nationalist movement (GAL). ETA, the stories of its victims, and the civil movement to 
delegitimise the organisation will take centre-stage – but the research director was 
adamant that ETA can be presented alongside jihadist organisations, given that all are 
‘criminal organisations’51. The discursive manoeuvres by which ETA and Al Qaeda are 
 
50http://www.memorialvt.com/en/ (last accessed 10 September 2019). 
51 Interview by the author with the research director at the Memorial Centre for the Victims of Terrorism, 
Vitoria-Gasteiz, 2018. 
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equated in the museum’s plans are discussed below, to demonstrate how Spanish 
collective memory of Basque separatism is mediated through a War on Terror lens. 
 
A committee of experts was founded to scope out plans for the centre and, in 2015 they 
released their report on the recommended content and mission of the centre52. The 
report of the expert committee, and the museum itself, explicitly equate ETA’s violence 
with that that of Al Qaeda, and strongly condemn arguments that ETA’s broad base of 
support – and opposition to Francoist repression – make it a participant in a conflict 
with Spain. This political context is explicitly taken off the table and banned from the 
Centre: 
 
After the defeat of ETA, the world that supported it is willingly working to distort what 
happened. They argue that a political conflict between Euskadi and Spain exists, and that there 
were two confronting violences - both of which produced victims - for which we need to 
apologise. Or they invoke Francoism as a legitimising element of ETA. Responding to these 
aspirations, the Memorial should become a meeting point of those who wish to build a faithful 
memory of what happened, based on the suffering of victims and the existence of ETA’s 
terrorism as a baseline, as the principal cause of the horror of the last forty years, of all that 
happened: without additions, but without forgetting. We want to value the polyphony of different 
narratives, but with the red line of refusing to accept the justification of terrorism or any other 
human rights violations. Neither would we accept the dictatorship or reactive terrorism as the 
base of ETA’s free and voluntary decision of killing its fellow citizens.53 
 
More surprising, perhaps, is that this depoliticisation of ETA’s separatist struggle does 
not just rely on the War on Terror’s narrative of terrorism as apolitical fanaticism, but 
also strongly invokes the Holocaust as the appropriate context for memorialising 
victims. The report of the expert committee situates the mission of the Memorial Centre 
for the Victims of Terrorism in the legacy of the Holocaust – opening with a quote from 
Primo Levi’s ‘If this is a man’ on the need for society to openly and fully assess the 
causes of the Holocaust in order to prevent recurrences. This is not simply a passing 
rhetorical device. Later, the Committee of Experts uses the letter of Elie Wiesel (the 
Head of the US President’s commission on the Holocaust) to President Carter to situate 
and guide their own project’s mission. Using no less than fourteen quotes from Wiesel’s 
 
52 Ministerio del Interior, Gobierno de España,  Informe de la Comisión de Expertos para la definición del 
Centro para la Memoria de las Víctimas del Terrorismo (Madrid: Ministerio del Interior, 2015). 
53 Ibid, p.9. 
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document on the importance of Shoah victims’ testimony and its capacity to redeem the 
world, the Committee draw a direct link between the Nazi genocide and militant 
struggle of ETA: 
 
“The murderers needed to create a division to fulfill their criminal objectives’, explains 
Wiesel. It is obvious that this was the case in the Basque Country, as it is obvious that 
this division is trying to continue today - so that we are not able to pay tribute to the 
victims […] Wiesel also speaks of the need to "fight against silence and ignorance." He 
reminds us that the Americans repeated "we did not know, we did not understand the 
magnitude of the problem." He himself, in his personal testimony of the tragedy that he 
experienced as a child, recalls that he repeated "this cannot be happening". What has 
happened with the terrorism of ETA should embarrass us, but we must also be aware 
that it has been a constant in all cases in which there have been affronts of this nature 
to human dignity. The criminals have always counted on the passivity of society, with 
the mixture of cowardice and ignorance, or both at the same time, of "not wanting to 
know". In the case of ETA, it also counted on the problematic situation of a transition 
from a dictatorship to democracy’.54 
 
The positioning of the Centre for the Memory of Victims of Terrorism in the legacy of 
the Holocaust is, at first, a perplexing discursive move. There has been no genocidal 
violence undertaken by ETA, Al Qaeda, nor any of the other protagonists discussed in 
the museum’s exhibits. An enormous difference in the scale of violence, as well as the 
state/non-state identity of the perpetrator, besets the situation of terrorism memory in 
the legacy of the Holocaust. 
 
The application of the Holocaust frame to victims of non-state terrorism is motivated by 
the transfer of cultural and normative significance, rather than any direct comparisons 
between historical events. As Baer and Sznaider show, the Holocaust can be understood 
as a historical event- but it is also a transnational pedagogical device and moral lesson 
which transcends the groups involved as victims, bystanders and perpetrators55. It is the 
universalised injunction of ‘never again!’ – used here to compel the condemnation of 
 
54 Ibid, emphasis added. 
55 Baer, Alejandro &Natan Sznaider, ‘Ghosts of the Holocaust in Franco’s mass graves: Cosmopolitan 
memories and the politics of “never again”, Memory Studies 8:3 (2015), pp.328-44; see also: Alexander, 
Jeffrey C, ‘Culture trauma, morality and solidarity: The social construction of ‘Holocaust’ and other mass 
murders’, Thesis Eleven 132:1 (2016), pp.3–16.  
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ETA. Perplexingly, the application of the Holocaust legacy to Spain is more commonly 
associated with the war crimes committed by fascist troops during the Civil War, and 
not the ETA campaign56. The context of the Holocaust was also entirely absent from our 
earlier interviews and documentary analyses. So, its deployment here is unusual and 
compelling. 
 
The application of the Holocaust narrative to terrorism frames it as apolitical violence, 
driven by evil, motivated to destroy the liberties and rights of democratic society. In this 
way, the War on Terror discourse of ‘new terrorism’ is consolidated through an 
additional cultural resource – further forbidding the exploration of political root causes. 
By associating ETA’s violence with the Nazi genocide, all statements about Spanish 
repression of Basque independence claims, and the emergence of the ETA in resistance 
to Franco’s regime become ‘apologies for totalitarianism’. The mental gymnastics of 
evoking (Nazi) state terror as a comparison for ETA, while forbidding the discussion of 
ETA’s roots as an opponent of Francoist state terror, evokes a schizophrenic tone in the 
Committee’s report. Here ETA – a non-state actor – is rendered as the equivalent of 
Nazi totalitarianism, but their original adversary – Franco’s regime – cannot be included 
in the same comparison. 
 
In a recent historiography of political violence in Spain, Pablo Sanchez León has 
outlined the topography of memory which makes this transposition possible. In ‘Past 
Jihads’, Sanchez-León speaks of the ‘regime of memory’ implemented within the 
Spanish transition to democracy57. The memory regime of the democratic period is built 
upon the post-civil war equation of both sides in the civil war. This is otherwise known 
as the reconciliation paradigm in which both sides were responsible and there were no 
winners and losers, but only shared guilt. When it comes to the collective memory of 
terrorism, however, this paradigm is shaken. Spanish laws to recognise the rights of 
victims of terrorism run contrary to the reconciliation paradigm – which has otherwise 
 
56 Armengou, M & Belis, R, Las fosas delsilencio ¿Hay un Holocausto español?  (Barcelona: Debolsillo, 
2005); Preston, Paul, El Holocausto español. Odio y exterminio en la Guerra Civil y 
después (Barcelona: Debate, 2011). 
57 Sánchez-León, Pablo, ‘Past Jihads, Citizenship and Regimes of Memory in Modern Spain’, European 
Review 24:4 (2017), pp.535-557.    
26 
 
stressed the oblivion of past misdeeds, to ensure the successful transition to 
democracy58. The pressures upon the ‘reconciliation paradigm’ from contemporary 
contexts of human rights and transitional justice causes fissures in Spanish efforts to 
memorialise terrorism – provoking the turn to unexpected sources which could lend 
stability, such as traditions of transnational Holocaust memory.  
Still, these fissures are visible to the careful observer. In Spanish memory politics, ETA 
and jihadism are framed as totalitarian projects – but Franco’s regime is often not (or is 
silenced as an ambiguity), and any contextualisation of ETA’s struggle in opposition to 
Franco’s authoritarian rule is vehemently rejected as an apology for terrorism.59 This 
discourse can be found across contemporary counterterrorism discourse and Victims 
Association rhetoric. For example, the Spanish terrorism Victim’s Association COVITE 
has levelled stringent criticism at the Basque government for maintaining that ETA’s 
emergence was contextualised by a prior conflict between Basque nationalism and 
Franco’s authoritarian repression of the region60. Similarly, in 2018, Sonia Ramos, of 
the Ministry of the Interior, spoke to media about the introduction of anti-radicalisation 
teaching materials in Spanish schools. Specifically those materials address the violence 
of ETA, as well as right-wing paramilitaries and jihadists. Ramos stated that: “We saw 
that they [students] studied execrable violence, such as the Holocaust, but there was no 
reference to a scourge that Spain has suffered for decades. It is very important that it be 
 
58 Ibid. 
59 After the conclusion of our data collection in 2018, very interesting developments have taken place in 
Spain. Franco has been exhumed from his resting place in the ‘Valley of the Fallen’ and political 
discussions are beginning about the criminalisation of ‘apologies for Francoism’. Such recent 
developments are unfortunately beyond our scope: our article only tells the story of Spanish 
counterterrorism, victims and memory up to 2018. 
60 COVITE, ‘COVITE requires the Basque Government to withdraw its teaching units for not complying 
with the Basque law on victims of terrorism’ (15 November 2018): https://covite.org/destacada/covite-
exige-al-gobierno-vasco-que-retire-sus-unidades-didacticas-por-no-ajustarse-a-la-ley-vasca-de-victimas-
del-terrorismo/ [last accessed September 1st, 2019]. For further debate on the emergence of organized 
violence in opposition to Francoist regime during the seventies, see: Zulaika, Joseba, Basque Violence: 
Metaphor and Sacrament (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1988); Baby, Sophy; Compagnon, Oliver & 
Eduardo  González Calleja, Violencia y transiciones políticas a finales del siglo XX: Europa del Sur y 
América Latina (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2009); Sanchez-Cuenca, Ignacio, ‘The dynamics of 
nationalist terrorism: ETA and the IRA’, Terrorism and Political Violence 19:3 (2007), pp.289-306; 
Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio, Historical Roots of political violence: revolutionary terrorism in Affluent 
countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019). 
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known, among others for its prevention effect”.61 At this point in Ramos’ argument, the 
temporality of transposition shifts – and the present is read back onto the past. 
Testimonies are operationalised as counter-terrorism resources, which work to build 
empathy between societies and victims. In the discourse of counter-radicalisation, this is 
understood as a counter-narrative activity which reduces the vulnerability of 
communities (particularly Basque ones, in this context) to radicalisation. 
 
But does the Spanish administration intend to reduce the vulnerability of Basques to 
radical organisations, or to suppress contrasting narratives of history? Both discourses 
are apparent. In our interview with the Centre’s research director, he stringently 
emphasised that the Basque region was never in conflict with Spain and that the vote of 
the Madrid parliament to erect the Museum in Vitoria demonstrated social consensus on 
the issue. The opposition of the Basque nationalist party, Bildu62, was not deemed to 
indicate valid political opposition by the Director, perhaps because they are often 
delegitimized as extremists in conservative discourse: 
 
They [Northern Ireland and the Basque country] are completely different contexts. 
There are some things in common, like for example, the ideology of terrorist 
organisations [represented] in power of separate states in Ireland or the Basque country, 
but for the rest, it’s completely different. Here, we didn’t suffer a conflict between two 
different parts, so, it’s not like a civil war. It’s a terrorist campaign in which 95% of the 
murders were committed by one side, by ETA and the rest are right-wing organisations 
and so forth […]here, there was this political consensus in the Spanish parliament to 
promote a memorial centre like this. So, there is this law of 2011, which created us as an 
institution, and most told political parties voted in favour of it, which one exception, the 
political wing of ETA […] But the rest voted in favour and I think that’s very important 
[…] we have to create a debate also and not only between, also with Basque 
Nationalists and everything.63 
 
 
61 Ramos quoted in Caro, Laura, ‘Today we have to learn what terrorism is’, ABC Spain (26 November 
2018): https://www.abc.es/espana/abci-toca-aprender-terrorismo-
201811250328_noticia.html#disqus_thread (last accessed July, 11th, 2019), emphasis added. 
62Bildu is a radical Basque nationalist coalition of parties, part of whose societal basis is the izquierda 
abertzale (nationalist/Independent left). It currently holds four seats at the Spanish Parliament (2019). 
Some of its members are however, considered the heir of a family of political formations that were 
banned buy the Spanish Political Parties Act (2002).  
63 Author’s interview with Research Director at the Centre for the Memory of Victims of Terrorism, 
Vitoria-Gasteiz 2018. 
28 
 
Interestingly, the Director’s denial that ETA participated in a conflict with political 
underpinnings broke down, later in the interview. We will address this at length, as it 
demonstrates the effect of War on Terror strategies and ontology (specifically, 
Countering Violent Extremism and counter-narrative campaigns) upon the 
depoliticisation of ETA as a totalitarian criminal movement. When we discussed the 
location of the Center in Vitoria-Gasteiz, he stated:  
 
We wanted to do this, not necessarily in Vitoria, but in the Basque Country; because the 
battle against justification, the legitimisation of terrorism is here. In Madrid, in Leon, in 
Catalonia whatever, they didn’t have this problem like concrete terrorist organisation 
with social support behind. Of course, in Madrid, they suffered a lot of kind of attacks, 
but there was this area where terrorism formed a lot of social support and that social 
support didn’t disappear after the cease-fire of ETA.64 
 
How does the Director hold such contrasting opinions? Simultaneously, he argues that 
there was no conflict in the Basque region, but also that ETA enjoyed a wide-ranging 
social support which still remains significant. 
 
The apparent tension between the two positions can be explained by their situation in 
the counter-narrative discourse of the contemporary War on Terror era. For the Director, 
and the expert committee of the Centre, the museum must be placed in the Basque 
country to counteract the residual pockets of extremism in Basque society which 
practice rhetorical ‘justification’. This is not interpreted an indication of political 
support for the radical nationalist project, but as improper, ill-informed ‘legitimation’ 
which must be counterbalanced by the pedagogical curation of victim’s experiences in 
the museum. 
 
Here we see the mediation of collective memory through distinct War on Terror 
ontology and strategy – that of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and counter-
narratives in use against pathologized, apolitical ‘terrorists’. These contemporary 
discourses depoliticise political violence by individualising protagonists (silencing their 
situation within political campaigns or their anger at state policies) and treating political 
 
64 Ibid. 
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ideology as a grooming technique used by radicalisers65. Political ideology is 
pathologised rather than treated as a collective force. By reframing political grievances 
in this way, it becomes possible for the Director to both deny the political roots of the 
ETA campaign and to problematize the continued prevalence of radical nationalist 
collective memory in the Basque Country. 
 
The reaction of Basque society to the Memorial Centre for the Victims of Terrorism, 
and this pedagogical incursion by the Spanish state, has been mixed. Critical voices 
which oppose the imposition of the Centre upon Vitoria by the Spanish state are audible 
– but struggle to gain momentum in the climate of the criminalisation of ‘apologies’ for 
ETA. Vitoria is a particularly insensitive choice of location for the Spanish memory 
project, as it is the location where armed Spanish police killed five peaceful 
demonstrators in 1976. The organisation 3 de Marzo, based in Vitoria, continues to 
represent the victims’ families – asserting their rights to recognition. The leftist party 
Podemos joined members of 3 de Marzo at the inauguration of the Memorial Centre for 
(some) Victims of Terrorism to protest the myopic memory project of the Spanish state, 
and its continued subjection of other perspectives. Demonstrating against the 
discriminatory memory project of the Spanish state, they organised protests against the 
visit of Prime Minister Rajoy to the site66. Mr. Rajoy was greeted by shouts of ‘thief’ 
and ‘chorizo’, with the crowd of thirty continuing to chant slogans such as: 
 
“HerriakEz Du Barkatuko” [“The people will not forgive”, in Basque]; “3 de Marzo, 
nosotros no olvidamos” [“March third, we do not forget”, in Spanish], “Aldehemendik, 
utzipakean” [“Get out, leaveusalone”, in Basque], and “zuekfaxistakzareteterroristak” 
[“You fascists are the terrorists”, in Basque].67 
 
 
65 Baker-Beall, Christopher; Charlotte Heath-Kelly & Lee Jarvis (eds.), Counter-Radicalisation: Critical 
Perspectives (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014); Home Office Channel Duty Guidance: Protecting Vulnerable 
People from Being Drawn into Terrorism: Statutory Guidance for Channel Panel Members and Partners 
of Local Panels (London: HM Government, 2015). 
66 Publico, ‘Víctimas de la dictadura piden a Rajoy "memoria" para todos los afectados por terrorismo’,  
Publico (23 May 2015): https://www.publico.es/politica/victimas-dictadura-piden-rajoy-memoria.html 
(last accessed 12 July 2019). 
67 Gaton, Natxo, ‘Rajoy descubre entre gritos la placa del Memorial de las Víctimas’, Gastiez Hoy (24 
March 2015): https://www.gasteizhoy.com/el-ministro-de-interior-inaugura-en-villa-suso-la-primera-
exposicion-del-memorial-de-las-victimas/ (last accessed 12 July 2019). 
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Another organisation representing the victims of Franco’s crimes, the Plataforma Vasca 
contra los Crímenes Del Franquismo, has also expressed visceral criticism of the Center 
for the Memory of Victims of Terrorism, calling it: 
‘An excluding project that the Spanish government is trying to impose in Gasteiz, 
ignoring decades of state violence which remain unpunished’.68 
 
These sporadic expressions of discontent disrupt otherwise totalising efforts to 
depoliticise ETA, to equate the organisation with Al Qaeda, and to transvalue the moral 
authority of Holocaust victims so that it can be applied to Spanish experiences of 
terrorism. These dissenting voices echo the Victims Associations dedicated to the 
Atocha bombing of 2004 (11-M)69 who objected vocally to being used in the Spanish 
state’s drive for incorporation within the Anglosphere-driven War on Terror project. In 
both contexts, this dissent makes visible the complicated topography of memory and the 
importation of War on Terror frames in Spanish politics.  
 
Conclusion  
In this article, we have offered a topography of counterterrorism policies and laws in 
Spain – emphasizing how international War on Terror ontology and strategies have 
been transposed, allowing Spanish political actors to equate ETA with contemporary 
jihadist groups. The international discourses of the War on Terror (particularly that of 
‘New Terrorism’, and counter-narrative strategies on the terrain of ‘the social’) were 
used as a frame through which Spanish politicians extended their delegitimation of ETA 
as an apolitical, criminal gang reliant on pathological loyalty from sections of Basque 
society. To this end, Victims’ Associations were centrally employed to condemn and 
reject any explanations for violence which referred to politics or historical grievances. 
Victims’ Associations have been forceful protagonists in the campaign to prosecute 
radical nationalists for commemorating the deaths of militants (under the ‘glorification’ 
law), monitoring any and all sources of speech and action which might stray into the 
 
68 Hala Bedi Irratia, ‘Querella alavesa y centro de memoria, las medidas que proponen las víctimas del 
franquismo a las instituciones’, Hala Bedi (22 March 2018): https://halabedi.eus/eu/querella-memoria/  
(last accessed 21 July 2019). 
69 Flesher-Fominaya, The Madrid Bombings and Popular Protest. 
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criminalised territory of the legitimation of violence, while giving voice to their own 
narrative that political violence is anything but political in frequent media appearances.  
 
However, this historical revisionism is not unidirectional. Once the delegitimation of 
ETA in hegemonic Spanish discourse was achieved, the context of the struggle against 
ETA was itself invoked to smooth over the implementation of the new counter-
radicalisation and counter-terrorist laws of 2015 onwards. By emphasising the 
continuity of the new policies with Spanish experiences of fighting ETA, policymakers 
and police were able to ‘emplot’ counter-extremism and foreign-fighter laws within an 
existing culture of counterterrorism. Victims’ Associations were, once again, central 
actors in the propagation of this narrative. 
 
This borrowing between the eras comes to dramatic fruition in the Center for the 
Memory of Victims of Terrorism, where militant organisations from drastically 
different campaigns are equated – to deliver a lesson about the importance of 
combatting social and political ‘extremism’. As we have discussed here, the Museum is 
emblematic of Spanish memory politics where the historical silence surrounding the 
Franco era has had complicated ramifications; ETA cannot be remembered as anti-
Francoist in this hegemonic discourse, nor the Basque country framed as having had 
conflictual relations with Spain, so the legacy of the Holocaust is imported alongside 
counter-extremism discourse to stabilise the complicated and contested history of 
political violence in Spain. Of course, given the exhumation of Franco since the 
conclusion of our data collection, the story of Spanish counterterrorism and collective 
memory will continue to evolve. 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
This research was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council grant 
ES/N002407/1 and the FP7 project details go here. The authors extend their deepest 
thanks to Xabier Tirapu Intxaurrondo of Universidad Pública de Navarra, Pamplona for 
his research assistance with this project. Xabier undertook a literature review of media 
articles about the Memorial Centre for the Victims of Terrorism in both Euskara and 
Spanish, before translating them into English for the authors. We deeply appreciate 
Xabier’s assistance, and the insightful constructive commentary of three anonymous 
peer reviewers which significantly improved our paper.  
32 
 
 
Charlotte Heath-Kelly is Reader in International Security at PAIS, University of 
Warwick. She is currently the Primary Investigator on the European Research Council 
funded project ‘Neoliberal Terror: The Radicalisation of Social Policy in Europe’. Her 
recent publications include Death and Security: Memory and Mortality at the Bombsite 
(Manchester University Press, 2017) and Politics of Violence: Militancy, International 
Politics, Killing in the Name (Routledge, 2013). Email: c.heath-kelly@warwick.ac.uk  
 
Laura Fernández de Mosteyrín is a lecturer in sociology at the School of Law and 
Criminology of Universidad a Distancia de Madrid. Her research in the field of 
political sociology explores state transformation and state-citizen interactions mediated 
by security. Her work brings together IR and World Politics theories (mainly critical 
terrorism and security studies) with sociology and criminology in an interesting and 
fascinating combination. Among her latest works include analyses of counter-
radicalization discourses in Spain in “Paradigmas y prevención del terrorismo: una 
aproximación al Plan Estratégico Nacional de Lucha contra la Radicalización Violenta 
(PEN-LCRV 2015)”, an analysis of the Terrorism Studies field and debates shaping it 
in “Los debates sobre el terrorismo bajo el signo de la Guerra contra el Terror: 
aportaciones desde la Sociología Política” , and the study of the War on Terror through 
a more sociological perspective in “On the Transformative Capacity of Events: 
Legitimacy and Political Violence under the War on Terror”. She is currently part of the 
Spanish national research Project SECURITYCULTURE:  "Los discursos de seguridad 
y su influencia en la cultura política en España”, and PI the GESP (Grupo de Estudios 
Sociedad y Política en un Mundo Global). 
 
 
 
 
